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Several studies have suggested that education is associated with later retirement from the 
labour market. In this paper, we examine whether adult education, involving enrolees 
aged 42 or above, delays retirement to potentially increase labour force participation 
among the elderly. With Swedish register data of transcripts from adult education and an-
nual earnings, which encompasses 1979-2004 and 1982-2004 respectively, we exploit the 
fact that adult education is a large-scale phenomenon in Sweden and construct a measure 
of the timing of the transition from being self-supported by productive work to being 
supported by pension transfers. We match samples of treated and controls on the propen-
sity score and use non-parametric estimation of survival rates. The results indicate that 
adult education has no effect on the timing of the retirement from the labour force. This 
can be contrasted with the fact that adult education is one of the cornerstones of the 
OECD strategy for “active ageing” and the European Union’s “Lisbon strategy” for 
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1 Introduction   
The developed economies face increasing shares of their populations in retirement rather 
than productive work. To protect future individual and societal welfare, it may therefore 
be crucial to delay the average age of the transition from the labour force into retirement. 
To improve the incentives for this, governments in many countries have already issued 
changes in the pension systems. Besides such policies, OECD proposes measures within 
the concept of “active aging”, e.g. measures to encourage retraining of older workers 
(OECD, 1998, 2001). The underlying view is that inadequate education, particularly 
among the low skilled, is an important reason for decisions to retire early as it increases 
the risk of becoming unemployed and decreases the chances of receiving job offers.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to study whether adult education at the compulsory or upper 
secondary level (henceforth AE), which takes place at the age of 42 or later, affects the 
timing of the transition from productive work to a life financed by pensions. To our 
knowledge, this topic has not been addressed before, presumably since it requires very 
long time-series data on earnings and training. The analysis is based on Swedish register 
data of AE transcripts 1979-2004 and labour earnings 1982-2004. Sweden is a suitable 
country for our study as it is mandatory, since 1969, that municipalities offer education 
for adults at the compulsory and upper secondary level. Participation is free of charge and 
full-time students are eligible to apply for financial support amounting to about €780 per 
month (2004 value) where one third is a grant and the rest is a loan to be repaid under fa-
vourable conditions. In the 1980s, around 100,000 individuals were enrolled yearly. Al-
though the numbers include those who were only enrolled in a single course, it can be 
compared to the about 300,000 adolescents enrolled in regular upper secondary school for 
youths. In an international comparison, the numbers in AE are thus high. 
 
The standard human capital model implies that the returns to education decrease with age, 
thus questioning the rationale of policies promoting AE. However, extending the standard 
model to include e.g. changes regarding information, relative wages, preferences, health 
and/or borrowing constraints (Altonji, 1993, Iwahashi, 2004, Killingsworth, 1982, Monks, 
1998, Sjögren and Sällström, 2004, Wallace and Ihnen, 1975, Weiss, 1971), it is possible 
that an optimal timing of investment in education occurs at a fairly late stage of the life 
cycle.  
 
Another standard assumption of the human capital model is a fixed time for retirement. In 
reality, at the point of investment in education, the actual timing of retirement is unknown. 
Some workers leave the labour force before the officially stated age of retirement. This is 
  2presumably more common among individuals endowed with skills that are obsolete or in 
decreasing demand, especially as technological changes have been claimed to work to the 
relative disadvantage of older workers (Aubert et al., 2006, Borghans and Weel, 2002). 
AE is a potential insurance against such a scenario as broadened and updated skills may 
increase the employability of individuals and, in a longer perspective, enhance the rela-
tive insensitivity to structural changes in labour demand. Empirical evidence suggests that 
high skilled older workers are less likely to leave full-time employment (Peracchi and 
Welch, 1994), are more closely attached to the labour market and less sensitive to labour 
market shocks (Blau, 1994). This may partly work through an apparent complementarity 
between on-the-job-training and formal education, observed among older workers by 
Schils and Fouarge (2007).
2 Another possible channel is that education is correlated with 
health. Kalwij and Vermeulen (2005) argue that health is an important part in explaining 
labour force participation among the elderly, while Lleras-Muney (2005) shows evidence 
of education having a causal effect on decreasing mortality. Concerning the influence of 
AE on earnings, several studies have found that the earnings returns of education among 
individuals aged above 40 are comparable to those of younger age groups (Jacobson et al., 
2003, 2005, Stenberg and Westerlund, 2008 and Stenberg, 2008).
3  
 
In the present study, our contribution is to directly address the issue of whether AE pro-
longs the working career. The study thereby adds to the literature on labour supply among 
the elderly. Unlike earlier studies of the effect of AE on earnings, this paper analyzes the 
potential effects on labour supply up to and beyond the official retirement age. An exten-
sion of working life among the elderly may mitigate the negative economic and social 
impacts of ageing populations. Moreover, given labour market imperfections, increased 
labour force participation has beneficial effects on the economy at large, irrespective of 
the earnings effects, as it increases the competition for jobs and moderates labour supply 
shortages in times of economic booms. Our main finding is that AE has no effect on the 
timing of retirement from the labour market.  
 
The paper is divided into four sections. The next section presents the data and the design 
of the study. The empirical method and results are given in Section 3, followed by a 
summary and discussion in Section 4. 
                                                 
2 On-the-job-training typically involves high-skilled individuals (e.g. Brunello 2001, Arulampala et al. 2004). 
Bartel and Sicherman (1993) found that workers in industries with high rates of technological change retire 
later to recoup the returns to late investments in on-the-job-training, but also that a technological shock would 
induce workers to retire sooner as the costs of re-training become too high. 
3 These studies take into account that returns differ due to earnings prior to enrolment. Merely introducing an 
interaction variable between age and AE or comparing point estimates between samples of “young” and “old” 
renders mixed results (Albrecht et al., 2004, Ekström 2003, Light 1995, Monks 1997, Zhang and Palameta 
2006). 
  32  Data and design of the study 
The data used in this study originates from various registers of the Swedish population 
administered by Statistics Sweden. Yearly data on AE transcripts and labour earnings is 
available from 1979 and 1982, respectively, until 2004. The sample is conditioned to in-
clude individuals with a year of birth from 1931 to 1944 (aged 42 to 55 in 1986 and 60 to 
73 in 2004), with eleven years of schooling or less. The restriction on prior education 
makes the sample members ineligible for tertiary education and excludes about one third 
of the population.
4 Further, we do not consider individuals enrolled in AE 1979-1985 or 
individuals with zero earnings in 1984 and 1985 (i.e. not active on the labour market).  
 
The treatment group is defined as first-time AE enrolees in 1986 or later who by 1989 at 
the latest had been registered for at least 125 course credits, equal to half a semester of 
full-time studies. The control group consists of individuals who were not registered at all 
or who were registered in courses amounting to less than 125 course credits. The institu-
tional setting for adult education in Sweden makes it plausible that participants are in the 
AE as a consequence of their own initiatives. Employees are entitled by law to be on (un-
paid) leave to attend any kind of training and to be reinstated with the same working con-
ditions and the same pay. There is a vast supply of AE, free of charge, as Swedish mu-
nicipalities have a legal obligation to offer adult schooling at compulsory and upper sec-
ondary level. Moreover, participants are eligible for study allowances sufficient to cover 
modest living expenses.  
 
Descriptive statistics of treated and control group members are presented in Table 1. The 
large number of individuals in the control group is an advantage, as it will ease the proc-
ess of finding control group members who are comparable to those in the treatment group. 
 
                                                 
4 Until the beginning of the 1960s, the schooling systems varied somewhat between municipalities but in es-
sence, pupils attended seven or eight years of compulsory school. Pupils with better marks were selected to 
attend their seventh year at junior secondary school (realskolan) which was at least three years and a prereq-
uisite for upper secondary school. Among those not selected, there was a second chance to enrol in junior sec-
ondary school at a later point in time.  
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Table 1: Sample means of treated and controls, males and females.  
   
  Males Females  
Born 1931-1944  AE Controls AE Controls 
N 1348 354529 4982 334647 
Age in 1986  46.33 48.15 46.92 48.42 
Child(ren) at home  1.272  1.080 1.244 .933 
Less than 9 years of schooling  .373 .588 .280 .470 
9-10 years of schooling  .142 .083 .115 .118 
1 year of upper secondary school  .022 .009 .302 .127 
2 years of upper secondary school  .464 .320 .302 .285 
Earnings 1982 (SEK in 1000’s)  75.7 79.5 45.4 49.2 
Earnings 1985 (SEK in 1000’s)  93.9 101.3 61.4 63.5 
Foreign born  .162 .110 .107 .113 
Unemployment benefits 1985 > 0  .116 .065 .098 .063 
Stockholm county  .177 .150 .174 .159 
Inland of Norrland  .060 .059 .064 .053 
Regional employment .835 .834 .835 .834 
   
Born in 1944   
N 215 31362 647 26992 
Age in 1986  42 42 42 42 
Child(ren) at home  1.519  1.449 1.772  1.529 
Less than compulsory school  .265 .468 .219 .347 
Compulsory school  .181 .128 .122 .151 
1-year upper secondary school  .019 .013 .309 .138 
2-year upper secondary school  .535 .391 .349 .365 
Earnings 1985 (SEK in 1000’s)  90.7 103.5 57.6  64.0 
Foreign born  .163 .100 .097 .099 
Unemployment benefits 1985 > 0  .126 .070 .114 .069 
Stockholm county  .195 .158 .170 .169 
Inland of Norrland  .037 .055 .060 .048 
Regional employment .837 .834 .835 .835 
 
 
The number of AE enrolees reveals that education late in life is predominantly a female 
phenomenon. We do not explore the mechanisms as to why this pattern arises but greater 
family commitments are likely to be correlated with a greater need and/or wish to go back 
to schooling when aged above 40. Importantly, those in AE are, on average, slightly 
younger, by 1.8 years (males) and by 1.5 years (females). We also note that the treated 
have a higher level of education, but lower average earnings prior to 1986. This some-
what unexpected pattern may indicate that the treated have been disproportionately hit by 
structural changes. They also received unemployment benefits more often during 1985, 
although the proportions receiving unemployment benefits in 1985 are only around 10 per 
cent.
5  
                                                 
5 The policy at the time was that in order not to generate perverse incentives, formal education was not of-
fered as an active labour market program. 
  5Regional labour market conditions potentially influence the effects of AE. Helpfully, the 
means of the regional employment rates are almost identical between treated and controls. 
We do not take migration into account when assessing the potential effects of AE since 
mobility may be an endogenous outcome of treatment.
6 The lower half of Table 1 con-
tains the corresponding descriptive characteristics of individuals born in 1944, i.e. con-
trolling for age. The differences in averages between treated and controls display patterns 
similar to the upper half.  
 
Table 2 presents descriptive data on the actual AE undertaken by the treated. The average 
is 390 course credits for males and 458 course credits for females (500 corresponding to a 
schooling year). The proportion in AE who attended courses at the elementary level in the 
period 1986-1989 was 28 per cent among women and 50 per cent among men. Almost 60 
per cent of the males attended at least one course labelled vocational. For females, the 
corresponding proportion is 36 per cent, but if one includes health related courses in the 
concept “vocational”, the share is 83 per cent. 
 
 




Total course credits  390.6 458.3
Compulsory level
Proportion registered  .503 .280
Registered compulsory credits  175.7 94.3
Upper secondary level
Proportion registered  .774 .871
Registered upper secondary credits  208.5 350.4
 




Social sciences  .398 .307
Natural sciences  .217 .120
Human sciences  .079 .057
Computer sciences  .056 .054
Health sciences  .044 .474
Vocational course  .584 .360
 
                                                 
6 Migration to another regional labour market is a very uncommon event in these age cohorts.  
  6To define a transition from productive work to dependence on transfers related to retire-
ment pensions of different forms (the outcome of interest in this study),
 our approach is to 
use a ratio, rit, for  individual i in year t, between pension transfers
7 pit and annual labour 








Individuals are defined as active in the labour market as long as rit < 1, meaning that the 
duration outcome is defined as the number of years an individual has labour earnings lar-
ger than or equal to pension transfers, starting from 1990. Durations may be censored due 
to e.g., death, migration abroad, or if enrolment in AE occurs.
 8 The latter is only possible 
for individuals in the control group. For our purposes, it is important that an observation 
satisfying our definition of retirement (rit > 1) is not followed by re-entries on the labour 
market (rit ≤ 1) in subsequent years. However, such events are rare and concern less than 
one per cent among the samples of treated and untreated. 
 
Using the above definition, Figure 1 and Figure 2 describe separately for treated and con-
trols the duration in the labour force through Kaplan-Meier survival functions, i.e. the 
proportion of individuals surviving at least up to time t. For both males and females, the 
survival rates are significantly higher for the treated. This descriptive data is not expected 
to reflect a causal effect of AE. In particular, the average age of the treated is slightly 
lower, something which may drive the differences in survival rates.
9  
 
                                                 
7 pit is the sum of part-time pensions, retirement (old-age) pension, national supplementary pensions (ATP), 
early retirement pension, including sickness pension and various occupational pensions. 
8 Until 2004, the last year of observation, the proportion of censored individuals is below 4.5 per cent.  
9 The macroeconomic background made the probability of retirement higher during the economic downturn at 
the beginning of the 1990s, but note that the regime under which individuals retire is the same for the sample 
at different points in time. 























































Table 3 presents the cohort-specific proportions still active on the labour market  (rit < 1) 
for treated and controls as recorded in 1997 (numbers in italics). As expected, the propor-
tions who are “active” tend to decrease with age, in particular as the age of 65 is ap-
proaching. In most occupations, the official stated age of retirement is 65 but early re-
tirement is generally allowed from the age of 60.
10 With our definition of rit, more than 40 
per cent of our sample is still active on the labour market in the year they turn 64 and 
thereafter, the percentages decrease to about 15 at the age of 65 and below 2 per cent at 
the age of 66. Among treated females, the proportions of active on the labour market are 
                                                 
10 Among the population aged 55-64, labour force participation and employment rates are higher in Sweden 
than the OECD average. For the active population, Blöndahl and Scarpetta (1999) estimate the average age of 
transition to inactivity in 1995. For Sweden, it was found to be 63 for males and 62 for females (rounded fig-
ures). The corresponding figures for the US were 64 and 62 years of age and for Germany, the largest econ-
omy in Europe, 61 for males and 58 for females. 
  8higher than in the control group. For males, the treated observations are somewhat scarce 
when separated into different cohorts, but a relatively stable pattern emerges that treated 
have lower proportions of active individuals compared with the control group, indicating 
that the higher survival rate of treated males, displayed in Figure 1, is driven by their 




Table 3: Proportions in 1997 still active on the labour market.  
      
   Males  Females    
   Proportions with rit < 1 Proportions with rit < 1 
Born  Age in 1997  NT / NC AE Controls NT / NC AE Controls 
1940  57  116 / 25151  .767 .798  425 / 22536  .798 .765 
1939  58  112 / 25796  .741 .765  387 / 23508  .796 .729 
1938  59  92 / 24685  .696 .737  356 / 23436  .778 .706 
1937  60  66 / 24160  .591 .674  335 / 23184  .719 .656 
1936  61  66 / 23697  .545 .585  302 / 23195  .702 .603 
1935  62  70 / 23395  .629 .536  220 / 22780  .659 .554 
1934  63  53 / 22983  .321 .462  241 / 23096  .668 .506 
1933  64  43 / 22710  .442 .407  209 / 23073  .545 .454 
1932  65  36 / 23491  .111 .136  180 / 24502  .150 .120 
1931  66  26 / 23700  .000 .013  173 / 24685  .017 .011 
Note: NT / NC gives the number of individuals in the treated and the control group, respectively. 
 
3  Empirical method and results 
Model and method 
 
We aim at estimating a causal effect of the treatment AE (as defined in Section 2) on the 
time to exit from the labour force, where we have defined exit as rit > 1. For this purpose, 
we use the Rubin causal model (Rubin, 1974, Holland, 1986) and the matching estimators 
adapted for duration outcomes in Fredriksson and Johansson (2008) and de Luna and Jo-
hansson (2007).  
 
For a given individual, let T(1) and T(0) denote her/his time to exit from the labour force 
when treated and not treated, respectively. One of these two potential outcomes will be 
missing because we either observe the outcome with or without treatment. We define the 
causal effect of interest as the difference in survival functions whether treated or not. Un-
der a set of identifying assumption given below, the Kaplan-Meier estimator of the sur-
vival functions provides an unbiased estimate of this causal effect for the treated group 
  9and a set of matched control group individuals.
11 We match on the propensity score (see 
Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983, for a theoretical justification) as matching on all covariates 
may be difficult due to “the curse of dimensionality”. The identifying assumptions are 
(see de Luna and Johansson, 2007, for a formal account):  
 
(A) An individual’s choice of AE does not affect the outcomes of other individuals. 
(B) The propensity score, the probability of being treated given the covariates, is strictly 
positive and strictly smaller than one. 
(C) Given the set of characteristics observed before enrolment in AE, the assignment 
mechanism is independent of the potential outcomes. 
(D) Conditional on the covariates, the different censoring mechanisms are independent of 
the outcomes.  
 
The propensity scores are estimated with probit models, only including explanatory vari-
ables with p-values of .2 or below as over-parameterization has been shown to increase 
the mean squared error and exacerbate the support problem (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 
2005, Waernbaum 2008). This rule-of-thumb is circumvented if covariates were neces-
sary for balancing observable characteristics between treated and controls.
12 We use near-
est neighbour matching with four control group observations on common support for each 
participant in AE. According to the balancing tests, the matched samples are comparable: 
the equality of the mean values can not be rejected for any of the covariates. 
The identification strategy adopted is based on the assumption of selection on observable 
characteristics (Assumption C). The validity of this assumption in our context is made 
plausible due to the availability of longitudinal records of pre-treatment income and un-
employment. These records are expected to catch systematic differences in individual 
productivity, ability and motivation before entering AE, which are major confounding 
factors (Glazerman 2003, Heckman et al., 1999, Smith and Todd, 2005). Moreover, the 
administrative registers allow us to control for other important individual and regional 
characteristics, many of which do show signs of being potential confounders. As will be 
shown in the next section, the unconditional positive effect of Figure 1-2, coinciding with 
the theoretically expected positive effects of AE, translate into AE having no effect when 
matching on observable covariates.  
                                                 
11 As mentioned in Section 2, censoring is associated with death, migration abroad and, for controls also with 
enrolment in AE.  
12 The balancing tests concern all covariates, including 14 year-of-birth-dummies, also interacted with earn-
ings in 1985 and earnings squared in 1985. Other variables are the earnings difference between 1985 and 
1982, the same earnings difference squared, the level of regional employment, a dummy indicating unem-
ployment benefits were above zero in 1985 and a variable giving the amount of unemployment benefits re-
ceived. Further, dummies for educational levels, foreign born, Nordic or non-Nordic country of origin, re-
gional residence in Stockholm, inland of Norrland and for one to five (or more) children living at home.  
  10Results 
Figures 3 and 4 display the Kaplan-Meier estimates of post-adult education survival in the 
labour force for matched observations of males and females. The dashed lines indicate the 
estimated survival for participants in AE. Labour force participation is below 50 percent 
after thirteen years for males, while a similar level is reached about a year earlier for fe-
males. For males, the differences in point estimates between participants in AE and con-
trols are small over the entire follow-up period. Point-wise 95% confidence intervals con-
sistently overlap between treated and controls (Table A.1 in the Appendix lists the confi-
dence intervals).
13  






















































                                                 
13 An estimator for the variance of the estimator is given in de Luna and Johansson (2007, Sec. 4.2), with 
which confidence intervals can be computed with a normal approximation. 
  11For females, the estimated survival rates are marginally higher for participants in AE the 
first nine years after education and marginally lower thereafter. However, the difference 
in point estimates of survival rates only ranges between .5 up to one percentage point. 
Again, the 95-percent confidence intervals around the point estimates do not indicate any 
significant differences between participants and non-participants (see Table A.1 in the 
Appendix).  
We can note that the substantial differences in survival rates indicated by the raw sample 
means presented earlier in Section 2 (Figures 1 and 2) do not apply when heterogeneity in 
observables is controlled for. To check the stability of these results, the procedure of 
matching on the propensity score was repeated with several selected sub-samples, sepa-
rately for males and females, conditioning on the level of educational attainment prior to 
education; place of residence in Stockholm; year of birth in 1940-1944 and 1934-1939. 
Similar to the full sample results, the differences in point estimates of the survival rates 
are generally small and we find no indication of significant differences in the timing of 
the transition into retirement between the samples of treated and controls.  
The results were also robust with respect to alternative definitions of the outcome vari-
able. One may consider what constitutes permanent versus non-permanent transfers, in 
particular concerning unemployment insurance transfer payments. Most definitions of the 
labour force include employed and unemployed, which speaks in favour of adding unem-
ployment benefits to the wage earnings, i.e. resulting in an overall increase of survival in 
the labour force according to our measure. This does not alter the general message of the 
results presented earlier – we find no indications of significantly different timing into re-
tirement between treated and controls. Moreover, using a minimum of 250 credits as the 
definition of treatment yields nothing substantially different from what has been pre-
sented above. The same applies if the limit number of course credits is set to 500 (i.e. 
equal to a schooling year). To summarize, our analyses provide no sign of a positive ef-
fect of AE on the survival in the labour force.  
Although it seems a reasonable hypothesis that additional investments in human capital, 
at later stages of working life, would influence the retirement age, we do not find any 
such indications. One may speculate on possible explanations for our findings. It may be 
the case that we capture many individuals who merely “consumed” education, implying 
that the motives behind the enrolment decisions were not related to labour market out-
comes. This argument is, however, at odds with the fact that the results are robust to 
rather large amounts of course credits. A different interpretation is that there is a positive 
earnings effect, as reported in Jacobson (2003), Stenberg and Westerlund (2008) and 
  12Stenberg (2008), but that it also generates an income effect which makes individuals re-
tire early, potentially counterbalancing a positive effect on labour supply.  
 
4  Summary and discussion  
This paper has analysed whether adult education of prime-aged individuals at the com-
pulsory or upper secondary level (AE) can be used as a policy measure to increase labour 
force participation during the later stages of working life. To answer such a question, it is 
important to have long time-series of data on AE and earnings. We use unique panel data 
on AE transcripts and annual earnings which encompasses 1979-2004 and 1982-2004, re-
spectively. We further exploit the fact that, by international standards, AE has been ex-
ceptionally large in Sweden.   
The empirical analysis is based on a sample of individuals aged 42-55, with short educa-
tions, who enrolled in AE during the period 1986-1989. Using a control group of non-
participants, and considering censoring from this group into future participation in AE, 
potential effects on duration in the labour force are examined up to and beyond the offi-
cially stated age of retirement. Our findings indicate that AE had no positive effect on 
survival in the labour force. The results are robust with respect to alternative definitions 
of the outcome variable, definitions of treatment, and are also unchanged if we study sub-
samples conditioned on year of birth, prior-to-enrolment educational level or Stockholm 
residents. However, the timing of enrolment in our sample, 1986-1989, coincides with a 
strong economic expansion period with low levels of unemployment. Therefore, we 
would not necessarily expect our results to generalize to all phases of a business cycle as 
different macroeconomic conditions may attract different groups of participants. 
Retraining of the older workforce is presumed to extend working life and is a cornerstone 
of both the European Union’s so-called “Lisbon strategy” for growth and jobs and the 
OECD campaign for “active ageing”. The results in this study indicate no effects on the 
timing of the transition from labour force participation into retirement, thus weakening 
the economic rationale for AE in this case. Proponents of AE for older workers would, 
according to our findings, have to argue on the basis of potentially positive effects on 
productivity while in the labour force or provide motives related to non-monetary issues 
such as fairness, social equity, increased democracy and similar aspects often included in 
the officially stated goals for publicly financed AE. 
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Table A.1: Survival rate confidence intervals of AE participants and control group members. 
           
  Males      Females    
    Survival rate,  
95 % confidence intervals 
   Survival  rate, 
95 % confidence intervals 
Time NT / NC AE Controls    NT / NC AE Controls 
1990  1246 / 4936  .964 - .982  .977 - .985    4723 / 17309  .970 - .979  .967 - .972 
1991  1208 / 4812  .938 - .962  .942 - .955    4591 / 16733  .940 - .953  .938 - .945 
1992  1176 / 4625  .896 - .927  .906 - .922    4451 / 16201  .900 - .916  .899 - .908 
1993  1120 / 4428  .859 - .896  .876 - .893    4253 / 15508  .870 - .889  .867 - .877 
1994  1070 / 4258  .830 - .870  .848 - .868    4114/ 14932  .840 - .861  .837 - .848 
1995  1030 / 4101  .798 - .840  .815 - .837    3960 / 14391  .800 - .823  .796 - .807 
1996  986 / 3918  .746 - .794  .774 - .797    3763 / 13645  .755 - .779  .746 - .759 
1997  923 / 3705  .698 - .748  .736 - .761    3540 / 12778  .707 - .732  .702 - .716 
1998  859 / 3505  .655 - .707  .693 - .719    3307 / 11992  .648 - .675  .649 - .663 
1999  802 / 3290  .593 - .648  .637 - .664    3022 / 11046  .588 - .616  .595 - .610 
2000  726 / 2996  .548 - .604  .583 - .611    2737 / 10099  .521 - .550  .536 - .551 
2001  668 / 2726  .490 - .546  .530 - .559    2425 / 9068  .452 - .481  .474 - .489 
2002  597 / 2465  .427 - .483  .473 - .502    2103 / 7985  .397 - .426  .412 - .427 
2003  523 / 2184  .357 - .413  .409 - .438    1844 / 6924  .335 - .363  .354 - .368 
2004  440 / 1889  .357 - .413  .409 - .438    1553 / 5930  .335 - .363  .354 - .368 
Note: NT / NC gives the number of individuals in the treated and the control group. 
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